Roman Malo

Healthcare professional testimony

Roman Malo, associate professor of clinical psychology

”We are not facing a new calculator. We are facing something that is radically new.” — A clinician-researcher from Nantes Université recounts how AI is shaking up psychotherapy, teaching and our relationship to evidence.

Roman Malo is an associate professor of clinical psychology at Nantes Université, within the LPPL laboratory. A graduate of a “plural integrative” clinical psychology master’s, he did his PhD in co-supervision between psychology/psychiatry and digital technology on the use of virtual reality as an aid to diagnosis and to the measurement of executive functions. His singular path — from video games to VR, then to AI — feeds a stance that is rare in the profession: neither naive technophile nor defensive technophobe, but an experimenter attentive to the tool’s concrete effects.

What strikes you immediately about Roman’s relationship with artificial intelligence is a reading that refuses the two usual pitfalls. No fascination with a quasi-divine technology, nor defensive rejection in the name of a threatened humanity. Instead: a demand for precision about what AI does, what it changes, and what it does not do. “I tried to approach AI from a position without presuppositions — it’s very difficult — but I find that when you approach AI and mental health, suddenly all the arguments that are usually scientific become almost secondary, and what counts is a worldview.”

This stance comes from far back. Well before ChatGPT, Roman took an interest in consciousness as a research object — “how consciousness emerges, the problem of consciousness, which for me is always a fascinating subject.” Then, by way of video games and virtual reality, he had practical experience of digital devices in clinical work. When AI arrived, it fit into this continuity of inquiry.

From video games to AI, by way of virtual reality

Roman’s path comes down to three stages: a teenage video-game player, a doctoral candidate on virtual reality as an aid to diagnosing executive functions, then an attentive observer of large language models from their first public versions. He sums it up himself: “It’s a bit of the video-game-to-AI path, the triptych so far.”

What had initially attracted him to VR was not the technology for its own sake. It was the promise of making ecological clinical tools that were not: “I was always quite surprised by how off-the-ground I found our tools for measuring cognitive functions. I was always very struck by their un-ecological character, until I discovered that some tests with recognized psychometric properties existed in gamified, ecological versions.”

The other interest was psychotherapeutic. Roman defends an active view of therapy: prescribing exercises, having the patient do concrete things — a parallel he regularly draws between the psychologist and the physiotherapist. VR served precisely that: enabling fine-grained therapeutic exposures, where exposure in imagination can be easily sabotaged by the patient or blocked by a difficulty in forming mental images.

Therapeutic friction: why AI can lower the step

At the heart of Roman’s clinical thinking there is a concept he mobilizes to think about both active psychotherapy and AI: therapeutic friction.

”There is a concept I really like for psychotherapeutic work: the idea of friction. I think that if, on their therapeutic path, the patient meets too much friction too early, they will drop out.”

Roman relies on a practitioner’s lucidity: “Our brain is very good at making us continue what we already do, and effort is costly.” Asking an agoraphobic patient who has spent fifteen years avoiding crowds to take the tram again at rush hour is asking them to cross a mountain in one go. VR — and now AI — allow you, on the contrary, to calibrate the step, to invest effort in the right place (the exposure itself) rather than the wrong one (the difficulties upstream).

This analysis overturns a common criticism of these technologies, according to which they would do things “in the patient’s place.” Roman offers another reading: “It’s not that the patient would no longer have to make any effort. It’s about investing effort in the right place.” AI does not replace therapeutic work; it lowers the entry barrier to care for those who need it.

An epistemological double standard applied to AI

Roman’s most original contribution to the public discussion on AI in mental health is probably the surfacing of an epistemological double standard. In many scientific publications and professional debates, AI is required to meet a level of evidence that is never required of a human therapist.

”All the pro-AI arguments have to be doubly proven, in a way. It’s rather strange.”

The archetype of this bias is the frequent comparison of an “AI psychotherapy” to a gold standard of human psychotherapy. Roman points out the naivety of the operation: “Is there a psychologist who has a perfect therapy and never makes a mistake? I think it’s a protection we’re creating.”

Behind this double standard there is a difficulty of categorization. AI is not a classic computing object (deterministic, predictable), but neither is it a human. For lack of an available category, we apply to it alternately the strictest requirements of both worlds — software rigor and human humility — without ever granting it their respective leniency.

For Roman, escaping this impasse requires reintroducing into the debate philosophical concepts that the quest for measurability had evacuated: “We will have to think as psychologists, but with positions that will also have to rely on philosophical concepts, and not merely take refuge behind evidence.” Morality, social contact, presence: so many dimensions that are hard to measure but clinically crucial.

A fifth narcissistic wound

Beyond epistemology, Roman reads the arrival of AI as a civilizational event — the contemporary equivalent of the great narcissistic wounds historically inflicted on humanity.

”We’re taking an additional narcissistic wound, perhaps, and this one, unfortunately, is costly. It touches on fundamental dimensions, notably consciousness and reciprocity in exchanges.”

After Galileo (the Earth is not the center of the world), Darwin (the human is not the summit of evolution), Freud (the human is not master in their own house) and sociology (the human is socially constructed), generative AI would add a fifth wound: our linguistic, creative and reasoning skills are not the exclusive preserve of our species.

Rather than defending against this wound, Roman invites another stance: curiosity. “I think you have to be curious and also a bit surprised, actually. Surprise is important in the face of this.” Defense against the wound does not treat the wound; it petrifies it. Only curiosity allows us to integrate novelty without submitting to it.

The psychologist as physiotherapist: horizontalizing the relationship

Throughout the interview, Roman returns to a structuring parallel: the psychologist’s profession increasingly resembles that of the physiotherapist. Specialized knowledge — diagnosis, protocol, exercise supervision, monitoring — is being horizontalized. AI takes part in this movement just as popular sports-medicine content and online tutorials did for the physiotherapist a few years earlier.

”Today, you injure your knee, you type in your symptoms, you get a diagnosis that’s often not too bad. You ask for a protocol to recover from the injury: it presents you with everything we already know. That knowledge used to be held by physiotherapists. Well, we psychologists find ourselves in the same configuration.”

A concrete consequence: the patient arrives at the consultation with “a list provided by ChatGPT” — a well-structured false knowledge about their own psychic functioning. The psychologist must then “convince that they are an expert”: show their credentials, explicitly ask “what do you expect of me?”, accept a new regime of relationship where expertise is no longer presumed, it is justified.

Roman does not conclude, however, that the profession reduces to what remains of the technical. On the contrary, he identifies a shift of value — toward relational qualities, toward making-feel more than making-known.

”With attachment disorders, you can explain to someone what it is to feel safe, to be in a secure space. But above all you can make them feel it. That’s something that remains a psychologist’s specificity.”

The frame, the setting, regularity, stability, continuity of care, being on time, being ready to listen — everything that makes up the fabric of a secure attachment relationship belongs to a way of being that cannot be coded in a protocol. That is precisely what AI does not reproduce — for now.

Roman also observes a parallel movement in academic clinical-psychology research: a return to the body. Embodied cognition, bodily synchronization, the embodied mind — currents that reintroduce into clinical analysis what psychotechnics had left aside. But the body, he says, “training the body without calling on the body, I find that difficult.” That is no doubt where the profession’s metabolization of this AI moment plays out: less in the struggle against the tool than in the rediscovery of what, in clinical practice, passes only through the present body — one’s own as well as the patient’s.

Teaching in the AI era: training reflexivity, not the result

On the teaching side, Roman shares the university’s difficulty in the face of generative AI. In Nantes, a working group has just proposed a V1 ethics code for students and teachers. But the subject moves faster than institutions. And the defensive strategy — forbidding, hunting for cheating — does not hold for long against a tool everyone already uses, students and teachers alike.

His pedagogical response comes down to two words: prosthesis and reflexivity.

”I like this idea of a prosthesis: you add on, you can enrich your work, but you first call on your own reflection.”

Concretely: begin with work outside AI, then use AI to restructure, clarify, verify. Always re-check what the AI says — “just because the language is pretty doesn’t necessarily mean the idea is correct, especially on sources.” And above all, shift the evaluation criterion: what should be evaluated in a future psychologist is not the performance of the deliverable (which an AI can produce at a respectable level), but the training of reflexivity.

”If you give a case study to ChatGPT, at the diagnostic level, the level of therapeutic proposal, the level of identifying signs and symptoms, you easily get a 15, 16, 17, 18 out of 20. But what interests me in becoming a psychologist and in training psychologists is training that reflexivity. Not the result, but the process.”

From this analysis follows a concrete consequence: rethinking assessment methods. Take-home assignments are increasingly hard to validate, hence a return to oral exams and role-play. In Nantes, Roman and his colleagues already call on professional actors to play patients at master’s level — but the setup does not scale to a cohort of 1,000 students. There, paradoxically, AI could itself produce realistic video clinical cases for large-scale assessments.

The polarization-of-consultations hypothesis

His current research topic extends this analysis on the clinical side. Roman co-supervises a thesis on the therapeutic alliance and autonomous agents, co-supervised in cognitive psychology and computer science. And he supervises a master’s dissertation on the therapeutic pathway modified by AI devices — with a strong hypothesis:

“For patients at subclinical levels, just below a clear symptomatology — say a 5 out of 10 on anxiety — I think all those below will not seek care thanks to AI, they will manage, tinker, improvise with its help. Whereas those who go above 5-6 will perhaps be led to seek care more quickly, since the AI will say: ‘here, I suggested this and it’s not working.’”

The hypothesis: polarization of consultations. Fewer simple cases, more complex cases directed sooner. For psychologists, this would mean fewer “easy” patients to see, but a sharper concentration on demanding clinical situations. And thus a shift of the profession toward what precisely resists AI: relational quality, alliance, the fine reading of bodily and emotional language.

This analysis converges with a recurring remark of Roman’s on the psychologist’s profession in the AI era: “The very technical, psychoeducational, explanatory, exercise-supervision, monitoring side — we’ll be able to automate it. But being able to have relational qualities, that’s really going to be added value.” The psychologist becomes the expert of making-feel: attachment security, the frame, the regularity of care, the quality of presence — so many dimensions that AI “does not replace, for now.”

The Rat Park of AI: it’s not the tool, it’s the solitude

One last contribution deserves highlighting. On the question of digital dependence — often waved as a scarecrow in discourses on AI and young people — Roman offers a decisive shift:

“Do you know the ‘Rat Park’ experiment? Rats are offered cocaine or food — most take cocaine. But offer these rats an amusement park, social activities and food: the choice of cocaine drops sharply. If today we have people so dependent on digital technology that it resembles an episode of Black Mirror, it’s perhaps because there is something problematic in social interactions. And it’s not AI.”

The argument is classic in the psychology of addiction since Bruce Alexander’s work: dependence is not a mechanical effect of the substance, but the symptom of an impoverished social environment. Roman applies the analysis to AI: “The anthropological and societal changes are, in my view, of a much more central urgency than AI. It’s very easy to blame AI.”

The invitation is clear: before blaming the tool, look at what makes people take refuge in it. Generational solitude, the impoverishment of bonds, the inflation of passive screens — those are the real issues. Conversational AI, unlike social media or television, requires an active stance, an engagement, an agency. Which makes it potentially a less problematic tool — provided it is not confused with a substitution for human relationships.

Pharmakon and projective test: two images to conclude

The interview concludes on two converging images. The first, offered by the interviewer: the notion of pharmakon. An object with three faces — remedy, poison, and a surface for projection as a scapegoat. AI is all of this at once: useful, dangerous, and a carrier of our own representations.

The second image, offered by Roman and particularly striking:

“Perhaps there is something to create, a bit like a Rorschach. Now, you would show a ChatGPT and ask: ‘what do you perceive?’ It might be a new projective test in fashion.”

The image of the digital Rorschach is apt: what everyone sees in AI says as much about themselves as about the technology. The doom-mongers project their civilizational fears onto it, the techno-prophets project their dreams of augmentation, and clinicians — like Roman — see in it what they already know of patients: phenomena of fascination, defense, identification, which deserve to be questioned rather than answered with enthusiasm or distrust.

To future psychologists, Roman offers two pieces of advice. The first: experiment and test AI, and read beyond psychology — anthropology, sociology, philosophy, computer science. The second, which might seem paradoxical: actively maintain relational skills in everyday life. Talk to strangers. Do your shopping without earphones. Do improv theater. “These are things you have to live and have to experience, and that for now AI cannot provide.”

What this testimony teaches us

Roman Malo’s testimony is not spectacular. It does not claim that AI will save psychotherapy, nor that it will destroy it. It does something rarer and more useful: it looks at AI — as a clinician looks at a symptom, a researcher looks at a piece of data, a teacher looks at a student. With curiosity, rigor, and the awareness of a long history (from video games to VR to AI) that prevents both naive fascination and defensive stupefaction.

His operative concepts — therapeutic friction, epistemological double standard, polarization of consultations, pedagogical prosthesis, Rat Park applied to AI — are tools of thought that psychologists can mobilize in their own practice. None is definitive; all call for clinical and empirical elaboration.

And his most lasting contribution is perhaps ethical: refusing to let the legitimate critique of AI serve as a pretext to flee the real issues. Generational solitude, the impoverishment of bonds, the rupture of transmissions — these problems exist before and independently of AI. Blaming the tool does not heal the environment. Roman invites us to reverse the gaze: what AI reveals about our lacks, and what our lacks do to our relationship with AI.

Testimony collected on 26 May 2026. Roman Malo is an associate professor of clinical psychology at Nantes Université, within the Laboratoire de Psychologie des Pays de la Loire (LPPL, EA 4638). He has published his researcher profile on this site.

Go further

  • Researcher profile: Roman Malo

Testimonies and field feedback

This testimony is part of our series on the uses of AI in mental health. Would you like to share your experience?